IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 803

International Court of Justice

H0803-0002

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании Трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0803 - 0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the Tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the Tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministère Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0803 -0004

Table of Contents

Austria

			Page
Dr. S.-I.	No. 88	Schuschnigg goes to Berchtesgaden; from report of Mr. Osusky, Ambassador in Paris, dated 15 February 1938	224 - 225
	No. 89	France urges Austria to resist. From report of M. Knenzl-Jizorsky, Ambassador in Vienna, dated 1 March 1938	226 - 228
	No. 90	Halifax is convinced that Austria cannot be saved. From report of the agent Dvornik on his Paris discussion, dated 11 and 12 March, 1938	229 - 231
	No. 91	Viewpoint of Office of Prince Archbishop in Vienna expresses on pastoral letter of 21 March 1938	232 - 238

H0803 - 0005

PAGO

No. 92 Sworn questionnaire of Dr. Stuckert, Secretary of State in Home Office, dated 30 May 1946 239 - 246

Netherlands

No. 93 Excerpt from document RF 601, PS 1155, paragraph 5, Memorandum on discussion in Field Marshal Goering's headquarters, dated 19 June, 1940. 247 - 248

No. 94 Document RF 122, PS 997. Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellory, to Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Berlin, 2 August, 1940. 249 - 250

No. 95 Document PS 835, USA 527, High Command of Wehrmacht to the German Armistice Commission in Berlin, 2 September, 1944 251 - 253

No. 96 Verdict of High Council of the Netherlands, 12 January, 1942. 254 - 259

H0803 - 0006

		Page
No. 97	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech on Tenth Anniversary of seizure of power, the Hague, 29 January, 1943	260 - 261
No. 98	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech on Tenth Anniversary of the seizure of power, the Hague 29 January, 1943	262 - 263
No. 99	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech; NSDAP meeting in region under its jurisdiction, Hengelo, 19 May, 1943	264 - 265
No.100	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech: NSDAP meeting in region under its jurisdiction, Hengelo, 19 May, 1943	266 - 268
No. 101	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech: On the defense of Holland's home guard Woert, 1 August, 1943	269 - 270
No. 102	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech of 9 November. Dated 7 November, 1943, Utrecht.	271 -272

H0803 - 0007

		Page
No. 103	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech of 9 November; Utrecht 7 November, 1943	273 - 274
No. 104	Excerpt from Seyss-Inquart's speech of 9 November; Utrecht 7 November, 1943	275 - 276
No. 105	Sworn questionnaire of the witness Wense.	277 - 300

H0803 – 0008

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO. 88
Defense Exhibit No.

I am quoting from page 82 of the book "Europaeische Politik 1933 - 1938 im Spiegel der Prager Akten" (European Policy, 1933 - 1938, as reflected in the Prague Archives),

by Dr. Fritz Berber, 1941 Essener Verlagsanstalt (publishers).

Taken from report of Ambassador Osusky's in Paris, dated 15 February 1938.

H0803 - 0009

(Page 225
of orig.
lines 2-7)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 83

Defense Exhibit No.

SCHUSCHNIGG goes to Berchtesgaden.

Secretary of State SCHMIDT[1] in the name of SCHUSCHNIGG informed the French Ambassador BEAUX on 11 February of SCHUSCHNIGG's proposed trip to Berchtesgaden, asking, however, that the matter be kept secret until Sunday morning.

1 Guido SCHMIDT, secretary of state in Austrian Foreign Office

H0803-0010

(Page 226
of orig.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 89

Defense Exhibit No.

I am quoting from page 87 of the book "Europaeische Politik 1933 - 1938 im Spiegel der Prager Akten" (European Policy, 1933-1938, as reflected in the Prague archieves), by Dr. Fritz BERBER, 1941, Essener Verlagsanstalt (publishers). Taken from report of Ambassador KUENZL-JIZERSKY in Vienna, dated 1 March 1938.

H0803 - 0011

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART no 89

Defense Exhibit No.

The conversation showed SCHUSCHNIGG's absolute confidence in France and the hope that Paris would oppose an assault on Central Europe; in that connection he made his remark on the common fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The French Ambassador, M. PUAUX, is working here with energy and, apparently with great success, for the maintenance of Austria's resistance.

H0803 – 0012

(From report of Mr.KUEN JIZERSKY's report,
Ambassador in Vienna, dated 1 March 1938).

3 The report is addressed to Mr. HODSCHA,
Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.

I hereby certify that the above excerpt is a verbatim copy of excerpts from the book "European Politics from 1933 to 1938 as Reflected in the Prague Archives" the original text of which I have before me.

(signed) Dr.Gustav STEINBAUER

H0803 - 0013

Dr. SEYSS - INQUART No. 90

Defence Exhibit No.

I quote from the book "European Politics 1933 - 1938 as reflected by the Prague Official Archives" by Dr. FRITZ BERBER, 1941, ESSENER publishing house Page 89, from the report of the agent DVORNIK concerning his conversations in Paris on 11 and 12 March 1938.

H0803 - 0014

(Page 230
of orig.
lines 10-13)

Dr. SEYSS - INQUART No. 90

Defence Exhibit No.

He regretted the English standpoint to the Austrian question. Lord HALIFAX is ostensibly convinced, that Austria cannot be saved.

Filed June 14

(Page 232
of orig.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 91

Defense Exhibit No.

I quote the Opinion of the

Office of the Prince - Archbishop

of Vienna in regard to the

Pastoral Letter of 21 March 1938.

H0803 - 0015

H0803 – 0016

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 91

Defense Exhibit No.

Opinion of the Office of the Prince – Archbishop of Vienna in regard to the Pastoral Letter of 21 March 1938.

The battle of National-Socialism against every religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular was to some extent a basic principle of National Socialism. However, time and again, in the battle against the Catholic religion there have been periods when the Reich Government attempted to find a way to reconciliation, although its motives for so doing were, as we now know were not honorable. Such a period was when Austria was overrun by National-Socialism, when the German armies marched into Austria by force of arms. At that time it seemed as if HITLER in Catholic Austria, wished to come to honorable reconciliation with the Church. HITLER himself and especially his retinue time and again emphasized that a new cultural policy was to be initiated. The Church would not repent it if it would take a loyal attitude toward the state.

These words of HITLER – which must be evaluated as a promise made by the first statesman of Germany, awakened in the Austrian bishops the belief that HITLER.

H0803 - 0017

and, with ihm, National-Socialism really endeavored to effect a reconciliatio with the Catholic Church. The hint that this religious revival could also spread to "Old Germany" has seemed to confirm the Austrian bishops in their belief in the possibility of a reconciliation, such as took place in Italy. That HITLER and his comrades deserved no credit, one could not then assert, not yet having had the experience of the war years. So the Bishops' Conference called by Cardinal INNITZER decided not to decline at once the proposed negotiations. In the negotiations, the bishops first took up complaints. They received the promise that all these complaints would be examined once the elections were over and there would be time to negotiate at leisure. In the meantime, the bishops were to sign a declaration which would be submitted to them. The bishops ultimately signed this declaration with modified text. It was then spread throughout Germany in the form of an election poster without the Bishops having even been informed of it. This declaration was read aloud in all Austrian churches on 27 March with the following introduction: "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is hereby proclaimed that this solemn declaration must be understood to imply a full guarantee of the rights of God and the Church".

H0803-0018

In the meantime, Gauleiter BUERKEL had the Bishops informed that, as an answer to the Bishops declaration, HITLER would, in a speech to be held in Vienna on 9 April 1938, make a binding declaration in regard to the position of the Catholic Church in the State.

On 5 April, Cardinal INNITZER went to Rome to report, where in the name of the Austrian episcopacy he made a further complementary declaration which was published in the "Asservatore Romano".

After returning to Vienna, Cardinal INNITZER heard that BUERKEL was very much disappointed about the "counter declaration" made in Rome and HITLER himself said: "I wished to make a binding declaration concerning the Catholic Church in Austria. After this declaration in Rome, I must however decide to call it off". Cardinal INNITZER reported to Rome about this, whereupon Cardinal PACELLI replied that the experiences of the past make it necessary not to be satisfied with assurances for the future but to strive for tangible facts and unequivocal assurances in the present.

After the elections, it was all over with all the promises about settling the Bishops' grievances. New drives were repeatedly carried out against the Church and its institutions. The Cardinals' complaints were slighted. Nevertheless, Cardinal INNITZER repeatedly

H0803-0019

protested against the encroachments of the Party and the State.

When in Summer 1938 the Party found itself up against growing reluctance on the part of the Catholic circles in Austria, Gauleiter BUERCKEL again attempted to arrive at an agreement between State and Church. His representatives called on the bishops individually to win them over to reconciliation. BUERCKEL suggested a truce during which neitor State nor Party nor Church would initiate peace-disturbing action. As a proof of his desire for peace, BUERCKEL offered the Boys' seminaries the right to public status which had already been withdrawn from them. During this truce, a peaceful agreement was ultimately to be achieved. The Bishops did not agree to this unreasonable request and had but one answer: "We want to see deeds". BUERCKEL now hoped in a general deliberation of all the Bishops to succeed in what he had failed in the individual negotiations. On the day preceding the scheduled negotiations the "Katholische Gesellenverein" and the "Deutsche Orden" were dissolved. Consequently, on 7 September Cardinal INNITZER addressed a letter to BUERCKEL in the name of the Bishops, in which he was informed that the Bishops had to decline any further negotiations with him, having, from past experience,, come to the conclusion that there existed no honorable desire for peace on the part of the opposition and that they could no longer have anything to do with/promises.
more

H0803-0020

With that, all official relations were broken off. From that day on, Church and National-Socialist State in Austria stood toward each other in the relation of avowed adversaries.

As early as 4 September, the Bishops had addressed outspoken words to the Catholics in a serious pastoral message on the matrimonial and educational problem, in which they defended the rights of the Church.

Cardinal INNITZER then spoke in a very open way on 7 October in St. Stephen's Cathedral to some 8000 young Catholics. After the religious service, there were stormy demonstrations in favor of the Viennese archbishop, to which the Party then replied with the well-known assault on the Palais itself. On the very premises of the Kurhaus, a priest, "Dominik" KRAWORIK was even hurled from the second story into the courtyard, breaking both upper thighs.

Subsequently, Cardinal INNITZER repeatedly fought the heresies of National-Socialism, and on the occasions of his visits to Catholic parishes, spoke courageous and frank words, which naturally brought him ever increasing enmity and even, in several instances (Koenigsbrunn, Kirchschlag) actual assaults.

In the meantime, the war with all its dreadful events had come and only one possibility was left to the Cardinal: to help with all his might the victims of National-Socialist oppression,

H0803 - 0021

who kept increasing in number, to the extent his means allowed: The Austrian bishops' peace attempts which were inspired solely by the one desire to save for the Austrian people, whatever could be saved, as must now be subsequently realized, were doomed to failure because the Bishops were up against men for whom loyalty and faith were only a vain delusion, This cannot, however, cast a shadow upon the hororable intentions of the Bishops. They had honorably and well, thought of and cared for the people. History will accordingly someday render them justice in this respect.

The above declarations were personally examined by me and found to be in accordance with the historical facts.

Vienna, 2 March 1946

Above document received at Easter 1946, upon my request made in the office of the Prince-Archbishop of Vienna, from Monsignor WEINBACHER, Prince-Archiepiscopal Secretary, being his opinion in regard to the Pastoral Letter of 1938. In lieu of oath.

Dr. Gustav STEINBAUER

Attorney-at-law

I certify herewith that the above copy of the "Opinion of the Office of the Prince-Archbishop of Vienna in regard to the Pastoral Letter of 1938" is a verbatim copy of the text before me.

Signed: Dr. Gustav STEINBAUER

H0803-0022

(Page 239
of orig.)

Filed June 10, 1946

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO..92....

Defense Exhibit No.....

Sworn questionnaire of the State Secretary for the Interior.

Dr. STUCKART 30.5.1946

H0803 - 0023

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO. 92

Defense Exhibit No. . . .

Questions put to the State Secritary for the Interior

Dr. STUCKART.

I. Questions by the Defense

1.) How was the execution of the annexation of the federal state of Austria to the German Reich considered constitutionally ?

2.) Was not the view of the Austrian national socialists that of maintaining Austrian independence under national socialist leadership and a personal union in the person of Adolf Hitler ?.

3.) Did not the Fuehrer suddenly think of something quite different on 13.2.38 ?.

Did he not have you and Dr. MEISSNER come from Berlin to Linz by plane, where you then brought the law into conformity with Hitler's wishes ?.

4.) Were not, above all, reasons of foreign policy the determining factor in this solution ?

5.) Did you not fly to Vienna on the same day to deliver this law to SEYSS-INQUART, who was very surprised ?.

H0803 - 0024

II. Questions by the Prosecution Authorities

1.) From when did you derive this knowledge? With whom did you discuss the plan?

2.) Who were the Austrian national socialists who expressed this idea?

Was the defendant one of them and did you discuss this affair with him?

3.) How did you get to know HITLER's original intentions? Was there an earlier draught of the law available, or you made a new and first draught?

4.) Will you describe more fully the factors of foreigh policy in case such existed - which decided the new draught of the proposed law, which was later put into force on 13 March 1938?

5.) Did SEYSS-INQUART protest against this draught of the law as is was proposed by you?

H0803 - 0025

Replies to the questions.

Re question I of the Defense and the Prosecution Authorities.

I was recalled to Berlin on 11.3.1938 from Bad Oberdorf in Allgaeu, where I had been on leave since the middle of February, by a telegram from the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Having arrived there in the evening of 11. 3. Dr. FRICK informed the State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of the Interior PFUNDTNER and myself - I was Ministerial Director and head of the Department I - Organization, Management and Legislation that the union of Austria with the Reich could be counted on in some form or another. HITLER would probably become the President of Austria in a personal union. As a basis for this FRICK mentioned the plebiscite which SCHUSCHNIGG decreed on 9.3.38 by surprise for the 13.3. which according to HITLER's idea is not in harmony with the Berchtesgaden agreement and which moreover in its nature was not provided for in the Austrian constitution.

In accordance with HITLER's command, FRICK instructed him to draw up the necessary national and Administrative legal opinions and to work out a draught for a personal union. After an exhaustive discussion with State Secretary PFUNDTNER about this order I sent it along to my department to be worked out. The draught was worked out during the 12th March. I received on that day an order from GOERING and FRICK to take the draught to HITLER at Linz.

H0803 - 0026

Re question 2 of the Defense and the Prosecution Authorities

The views of the Austrian national socialists at that time were not known to me, No Austrian national socialist expressed to me the opinion that he considered it desirable to preserve Austrian independence under national socialist leadership and a personal union in the person of HITLER.

Re question 3 of the Defense and the Prosecution Authorities

As soon as I arrived at Linz in the forenoon of 13 March in the Hotel Weinzinger, where HITLER stayed, I was surprised to hear from a person close to HITLER - who he was I no longer know - that HITLER has decided on the union of Austria with the Reich. At the reception, HITLER told me immediately - as far as I can remember it was in the presence of BORMAN and BUERCKEL - that he had already instructed KEPPLER in Vienna to negotiate with SEYSS-INQUART about the union of Austria with the Reich. I was to fly immediately to Vienna to assist KEPPLER as a legal counsel. Austria was to become a part of the German Reich like Bavaria and other German provinces. The Austrian population was to vote about the union to be expressed by the law as soon as possible, at the latest by the middle of April. He further desired that the incorporation of Austria should be defined as a"re-union" as an indication of Austria's formerly

H0803 — 0027

belonging to the German Reich. Austrian law was to remain in force insofar as it was not in contradiction with the re-union.

I did not produce the draught which I had brought with me, as it had been superseded by HITLER's disclosures.

Together with Ambassador CLODIUS of the Foreign Office I outlined the points emphasized by HITLER and as per instructions dictated a rough draught of the law to a typist. I had a copy of it delivered to HITLER. Immediately afterwards - it was midday - I flew to Vienna in order to place myself at KEPPLER's disposal as per instructions.

The draught made by my department for a personal union was the first draught of the Austrian question.

I do not remember whether there were still any draughts available in the document files of negotiations about an Anschluss between Vienna and Weimar in 1919.

A Dr. MEISSNER was not present.

Re question 4 of the Defense and the Prosecution Authorities.

If I remember rightly, HITLER mentioned in Linz the affirmative attitude of MUSSOLINI toward the question of the Anschluss which was conveyed to him during the night of 13 March. It is possible that this attitude was a decisive factor in his decision to carry out the union with Austria.

H0803 - 0028

Re question 5 of the Defense and the Prosecution Authorities.

According to instructions I proceeded to KEPPLER in Vienna and gave him the draught of the law. Early in the afternoon of 13 March KEPPLER presented SEYSS-INQUART in my presence in the Chancellery Office of the Federal State with the instructions given to him by HITLER to discuss the union and also gave him the draught of the law. SEYSS-INQUART seemed - like everybody else that day - surprised at the quick development which hardly anybody had expected or foreseen.

It is possible that he expressed the opinion that he considered only a personal union to be attainable.

In the course of the afternoon SEYSS-INQUART then had the draught of the law prepared after the sketch of the law which had been made, which he submitted to the Austrian Council of Ministers late in the afternoon.

SEYSS-INQUART did not make any protest to me. Moreover, this would not have been in keeping with the general atmosphere. He could hardly have escaped from the really overwhelming outbreak of the people and their constantly repeated demonstrations for union with the Reich.

Dr.Wilhelm STUCKART.

There has appeared before me this 30 day of May 1946 one Dr. Wilhelm STUCKART, being of sound mind who deposeth and sweareth that the testimony contained herein over his signature is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Subscribed

H0803 - 0029

in my presence.

Robert B. STARNES

1st Lt. Inf.

I certify herewith that the above copy of the questions of the Defense and Prosecution Authority as well as the answers of Dr. STUCKART agree verbatim with the text before me.

(s.) Dr. Gustav STEINHAUER

H0803 - 0030

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 93

Defense Exhibit No.

I quote from the notes on the conference at the headquarters of Field Marshal GOERING of 19 June 1940,

Berlin, 20 June 1940, 1st copy, top secret, paragraph 5

RF 601, PS 1155.

H0803-0031

(Page 248, lines 6 to 8 incl.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 93

Defense Exhibit No.

With reference to HOLLAND, a cautious policy is to be followed. It is intended to leave Holland independent, but to bind it closely to the Reich.

H0803-0032

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No 94

Defense Exhibit No. .....

I quote from RF 122, PS 997.

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Dr.LAMMERS to Reichsleiter ROSENBERG, Berlin

2 August 1940

H0803 - 0033

(Page 250. lines 11 to 25 incl.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 94

Defense Exhibit No.

From Document RF 122, PS 997

.....

Mission and task.

With the appointment as Reich Commissioner, the mission has been imposed to safeguard public order and public life, thus guaranteeing the interests of the Reich,

and connected therewith is the task

to bind the Netherlands economically as far as possible to the Reich apart from military precautions, although the independence of the Dutch-East Indian territories is to be retained.

This task can be accomplished the creation of a political will which allows the economic connection of the Netherlands with the Reich to appear as the result of the will of the Dutch people is successful.

I herewith certify that the above excerpt copy from document RF 122, PS 997 is a verbatim copy of the document on hand.

Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER

H0803 - 0034

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO 95

Defense Exhibit No. .....

I quote document PS 835, USA 527,
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
to the German Armistice Commission,
Berlin, 2 September 1944.

H0803 – 0035

(Page 253, lines 23 to 25 incl.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO 95

Defense Exhibit 16.....

In accordance with the decrees referred to, all non-German civilians in the occupied territories who have endangered the security and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of terror and sabotage or in any other way, are to be handed over to the Security Police and to the Security Service (SD).

H0803 - 0036

(Page 254
of orig.)

Filed June 12, 1946

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 96

Defense Exhibit No.

Verdict of the High Council
of the Netherlands, dated
12 January 1942, reprinted in
the journal on foreign public
law and international law,
volume VI, No. 3/4,
Berlin, October, 1943
(pages 596-598).

H0803 - 0037

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 96

Defense Exhibit No.

Decision of the High Council

(Criminal Court) dated 12 January, 1942

(Messrs. TAVERNE, DE MENTHON BAKE, SERVATIUS, VAN DER FLIER,

DE VISSER.)

"The High Council, etc.;

After hearing of the report of Town-Councillor VAN DER FLIER; in consideration of the reversal of judgment asked for in the pleading submitted in the name of the defendant and substantiated by oral presentation, reading (see application);

Inasmuch as by confirmed judgment, - with reason (Begruendung) for sentence as mentioned - it is held proven that, etc. (see application);

Inasmuch as - as far as the brief is concerned -:

The rules of land warfare of 1907 - described in more detail in the brief, were added as an integral part to the agreement on laws and regulations governing land warfare signed by Holland on 18 October, 1907 at the Hague and which were approved by the decree of 1 July, 1909 (Staatsblatt 1909, 231) - and which agreement after its ratification, (by Germany and Holland, among other Powers), was published in Staatsblatt 1910 No. 73;

Inasmuch as Article 42, paragraphs 1, and Article 43 of the above mentioned rates provide that:

H0803-0038

Article 42, 1st paragraph: "A territory is considered occupied when it is actually in the power of the enemy army."
Article 43: "After lawful powers have actually passed into the hands of the occupying power it is incumbent on the latter to take all measures dependent on him, with a view to reestablishing and maintaining as far as possible public order and public life in a manner in harmony with the laws of the country, unless serious difficulties would arise from such procedure";

That in consequence of the fact of the occupation, it is incumbent on the occupying Power, in accordance with these rules, i.e. with the limitations mentioned therein, to lay down binding rules for the reestablishment and ensuring of public order and public life, and to issue for the Reich Commissioner for the occupied territory, appointed by decree of the Fuehrer regarding the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands dated 13 May 1940 (VOBL. for the occupied Dutch territory No. 1/1940) to exercise the highest governmental authority, decrees with legal sanction which possess the above-mentioned authority.

That by reason of his decree regarding the authority vested in the Secretaries-General of the Dutch Ministries (No. 23/1940) the Secretaries-General

H0803 - 0039

the Reichscommissioner has authorized the General Secretaries, within the scope of their pertinent spheres of jurisdiction, whereby apparently affairs concerning their Ministries are meant to take the necessary measures for guaranteeing public order and for safeguarding public life, particularly legal regulations,

that the legal regulations to be considered here, in so far as concerns Paragraph 2 Article 2 of the decree of the above mentioned Reich-commissioner concerning the exercising of the governmental authority in the Netherlands No. 3/1940 are to be submitted to the Reich commissioner before publication, and that publication must be deferred if requested by the Reich Commissioner, and that the Reich Commissioner reserves his judgment as to whether they are in accordance with his aims and opinions, and after publication they have the same legal force as regulations issued personally by him;

that consequently the decree regarding the regulation of the Secretary General for the Ministry of Justice are the legal treatment of economic criminal matters, published in V O B L for the occupied Territories of the Netherlands (No. 71/1941)is to be considered as a legislative measure issued by the occupying power,,and that such regulation possessing legal authority, cannot, under present conditions be denied its legal character within the Dutch legislation,- that the Supreme Council also, if in Cassation and accused of violation or faulty application of these regulations, regards this charge of violation or faulty application of these regulation within the meaning of Art. 99, para I, fig. 2 of the Law regarding judicial organisation, and takes note of this charge

H0803 - 0040

but that the Netherlands judge is not permitted to judge of the inner value or the justice of a law or to examine a law by an agreement such as one, the constituent part of which is the Rules of Land Warfare 1907, and not a regulation such as the above mentioned decree of the FUHRER:

that furthermore neither the history nor the wording of Article 43 of the frequently mentioned Rules of Land Warfare give reason to suppose that when drawn up, the intention was to grant authority to the judicial power, still functioning in occupied territory in accordance with the purpose of this article, to examine the principles of the measures taken by the occupier to guard the interests referred to in this article, in order that the laws valid in the country may be taken into consideration in the event of there being no cogent obstacle thereto,

that furthermore no indication is to be gathered from the Parliamentary history of the Netherlands concerning the Rules of Land Warfare, that there was the intention then or even the idea that in the event of an occupation, provided for

H0803-0041

in this regulation, the judivial power of the Netherlands should have authority to examine, as presumed in the brief;

that as this brief cannot be brought before the Court of Cassation the revision of the verdict is rejected.

Submitting to the International Military Tribunal above decision of the "Supreme Council of the Netherlands" of 12 January 1942, I declare that the same had been translated by me into German from the Dutch text of the WEEKBLAD VAN HET RECHT 104. Year No 271 and published in the journal for Foreign Public Law and International Law, Volume XI, pages 596 - 598.

Furthermore I certify, that above text is a true transcript from the above - mentioned periodical.

BONN, 1 May 1946

Dr. HERMANN MOSLER

Attorney-at-Law

I hereby certify that the above copy "Sentence of the Supreme Council of the Netherlands" corresponds verbally to the text on hand.

(Dr.GUSTAV STEINBAUER)

H0803 - 0042

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 97

Defense Exhibit No. ....

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands"

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART. Volk and

Reich Publishers, Amsterdam 1944.

Page 118 from the speech:

On the occasion of the 10th

anniversary of the seizure of

power,

The Hague, 29 January 1943

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803-0043

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 57

Defense Exhibit No. ....

Page 118

..... However the prerequisite for the integration into the order according to the principles of National Socialism as the most appropriate order of community life is the recognition of National Socialism as the foundation of life from one's own power of decision. Therefore, this National Socialist way of life cannot even be impressed upon a Germanic people through an internal political seizure of power, but it is the primary task of the National Socialists to convince their compatriots of the correctness of their political idea, and to win them for this idea and its realization.

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me.

signed: Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER

H0803 - 0044

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 98

Defense Exhibit No. . . . . .

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands".

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART.

Volk und Reich Publishers Amsterdam, 1944

Page 124 from the speech

"On the 10th anniversary of the seizure of power, The HAGUE", 29 January 1943

PS 3420, USA 708

H0803 - 0045

(Page 263
of orig.)

Dr. SEISS-INQUART No. 9

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Page 124.

.....It is equally clear that, now more than ever we must suppress every resistance which is directed against this fight for existance. Some time ago, the representatives of the churches wrote to the Wehrmacht Commander and to me in which they presented their objections to the execution of those death sentences which the Wehrmacht Commander announced in the meantime. To this I can only say the following:

At the moment when our Husbands, fathers and sons look with iron determination towards their fate in the East and unflinchingly and steadfastly comply with their highest pledge, it is unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal it is to weaken the rear of this Eastern front. Whoever dares this must be annihilated. We must be severe and become even more severe toward ourselves and toward our enemies, this is the command of a relentless sequence of events for us and a duty perhaps humanly difficult, but holy. We remain human because we do not torture our opponents, we must remain hard by destroying them.

I herewith certify that the above copy of excerpts from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy from the book before me.

signed: Dr. Gustav STEINBAUER.

H0803 - 0046

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 99

Defense Exhibit No. .....

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands"

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART,

Volk und Reich Publishers

Amsterdam, 1944, page 131,

from the speech: "Meeting of

the region under the jurisdiction

of the NSDAP".

Hengelo, 19 May 1943.

PS 3430, USA 708

H0803 - 0047

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 99

Defense Exhibit No.....

Page 131

..... Summary courts have a very difficult task. On the one hand, they must warn by lightning-like action and prevent expansion, and on the other hand they must in these cases strike the guilty and the responsible person. This is difficult; for the responsible persons, the really guilty ones do not walk around in the streets during such occurrences. I believe to be able to say that in these cases the summary courts have done their outmost. They have wherever able, apprehended the responsible agencies, bureau chiefs, plant managers etc, and after having determined their responsibility, their position did not give them any advantage, but on the contrary, then they were held even more responsible. I know with what care the courts have operated; for something occurred which seldom happens in summary courts, there were acquittals, there were transfers to the regular courts whenever the facts were not clear, and there were quite a large number of convictions to which the summary courts said at once: "Please don't carry out the death sentences for the time being; let us wait how it will continue."

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me.

signed: Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER.

H0803 - 0048

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 100

Defense Exhibit No. .....

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands"

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART

Volk und Reich Publishers

Amsterdam, 1944, page 133

from the speech: "Meeting of

the Region under the Jurisdiction

of the NSDAP"

Hengelo, 19 May 1943.

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803 - 0049

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 100

Defense Exhibit No. .....

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands"

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART

Volk und Reich Publishers

Amsterdam, 1944, page 133

from the speech: "Meeting of

the Region under the Jurisdiction

of the NSDAP"

Hengelo, 19 May 1943.

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803 - 0050

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 100

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Page 133

..... It is not a patriotic deed if today someone hides his food, his grain, his butter etc. and does not bring it into regular distribution. The excuse that damage is thereby done to the German Reich, is false, for I can tell you: the requirements which the Reich wants, are not so great so that they could not be fulfilled and protected under all circumstances. In their most important points, they correspond to that what the occupant can require according to the Hague convention concerning land warfare, and so to say, they comprise a kind of compensation for that what Dutch workers receive who work outside of the country. The black market must be combatted by you. And in this connection, you are absolutely sovereign. If the Dutchmen do not wish, then there will be no black market; for the first seller of black goods in the field of foods in this country must always be a Dutchman. If the Dutchman keeps up national discipline, then there is no black market. But in order to assure especially our own discipline and our own responsibility, I have arranged with the Wehrmacht Commander, that no one

H0803-0051

will obstruct the Dutch executive agencies when they prosecute a black market operator.

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me.

signed: Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER

H0803-0052

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 101

Defense Exhibit No.

I quote from the book:

"Four Years in the Netherlands"

by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART,

Volk und Reich Publishers Amsterdam

1944. Page 167, from the speech on

the occasion of the swearing in of the

Dutch Homeguard (Landwacht).

Woert, 1 August 1943.

PS 3430, USA 708.

H0803-0053

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 101

Defense Exhibit No.

Page 167

..... I have given all orders to suppress these symptoms with a severeness corresponding to the brutality of the crime. If in connection with these measures Dutch citizens are affected and have to undergo difficulties and restrictions of a special nature, then they must seek the cause for this solely and only in these outbreaks of an anarchistic mental attitude of individual culprits and in the equally criminal tolerance, or at least indifference within their own circles.

I herewith certify that the above copy of excerpts from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy from the book before me.

signed: Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER.

H0803-0054

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO. ..102.....

Defense Exhibit No.....

I quote from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" ("Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden") Dr. SEYSS-INQUART, Volk and Reic. Publishers, Amsterdam 1944, page 193, from the speech on the occasion of 9 November, dated

7 November 1943. Utrecht.

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803-0055

(Page 272
of orig.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART NO..102.....

Defense Exhibit No.....

Page 193

..... The nature of Europe is the extraordinary variety, the richness in blossoms of the unique (arteigen) blood related cultures and national personalities who have developped their nationality here in the individual countries and districts, as in large and beautiful shells presented by nature. We would cease to be Europeans, if we would no longer see our calling in maintaining and promoting this wealth of blossoms of the unique and blood related cultures of the European peoples.

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me,

signed: Dr. Gustav STEINBAUER

H0803-0056

(Page 273
of orig.)

Dr. SEYSS-YNQUART NO...103.....
Defense Exhibit No. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,

I quote from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" ("Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden") Dr. SEYSS-INQUART, Volk and Reich Publishers, Amsterdam, 1944, page 201, from the speech on the occasion of 9 November, dated 7 November 1943.

Utrecht.

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803-0057

(Page 274
of orig.)

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 103

Defence Exhibit No. . . . . .

Page 201

. . . . . Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands? Why do they care about all affairs, anyhow, why do they not limit themselves to the military occupation problems? This is connected with the fact that we are in a total, in the most total war, that it is quite clear to us who have experienced four years of world war and even more that there will be a moment of tension at the end of which there is no longer any demarcation, at all, between what is important for war and military, and what is private and civilian . . . . . .

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me.

signed Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER.

H0803-0058

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 104

Defense Exhibit No. . . . . .

I quote from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" (Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden) by Dr. SEYSS-INQUART, Volk and Reich Publishers, Amsterdam, 1944, page 201, from the speech on the occasion of 9 November, dated 7 November 1943. Utrecht.

PS 3430 USA 708

H0803-0059

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 104

Defence Exhibit No. . . . . .

Page 201

. . . . . Certainly, the Dutch National Socialists are the ones who probably have to suffer most from a certain schism, since they have to tell themselves that the Germans take their measures due to a certain caution, but that this must at the same time be felt as a limitation and oppression of Dutch life.

I herewith certify that the above copy of an excerpt from the book "Four Years in the Netherlands" is a verbatim copy of the book before me.

signed Dr. GUSTAV STEINBAUER.

H0803-0060

(Page 277
of orig.)

Filed
June 11, 1946

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 105

Defense Exhibit No.

Sworn answers to an interrogatory
by the witness Von Der WENSE.

H0803-0061

Dr. SEYSS-INQUART No. 105

Defense Exhibit No.

Questions and answers by the former Ministerialrat in the Reich Food Ministry. Chief of the Main Department for Food in the occupied Dutch territories, last in GRONINGEN:

VON DER WENSE.

1.) Were you in the occupied Dutch territories from May 1940 onwards, first as deputy and, from 1941, as head of the Main Food Department?

A.) Yes, but Leiter de facto first from January 42 onwards, de jure from about July 42.

2.) Were you in continual close contact with the Dutch General Secretary, HIRSCHFELD, and with General Director LOWES, head of the Dutch Food Organization?

A.) Yes, particularly with General Director LOWES.

3.) Did the Security Police and also the Authorities of the Armed Forces and the Reich Central offices have very strong misgivings as to the Dutch Food Organization and as to General Director LOWES? Was there not proof that the Food Organization frustrated the regulations of the occupying power and was in close contact with resistance circles?

A.) Yes, above all the SD and the Party, the Wehrmacht less. These misgivings were ever more forcibly expressed particularly in the case of LOWES, because of his political opinions.

H0803-0062

I did not hear of any facts which illustrated that the Food Organization as such basically frustrated the regulations of the occupying power. I did not doubt that its attitude was anti-German, it could be assumed that it was in contact with resistance circles. I had the impression that German regulations were systematically frustrated only in particular instances.
(see e.g. answers to questions 20 and 57 below).

4.) Did not the Reich Commissar allow no change to be made in the Food Organization, especially the dismissal of LOWES, the General Director and his replacement by a Dutch National-Socialist, because he considered it more important in the interests of the feeding of the Dutch people that this organization be maintained?

A.) Yes.

5.) Did not the Reich Commissar go himself to Berlin to Reich Minister BAKE in order to prevent the dismissal of the witness (M.R.v.d.WENSE) for the same reasons?

A.) Yes (see below, answer to question 50).

6.) Was agricultural production in Holland converted in the year 1940, at the instigation of the German authorities, from the cultivation and export industry to the production of food directly for human consumption?

A.) Yes, in complete agreement and in close co-operation with Dutch experts, particularly General Director LOWES and leading Dutchmen in the agrarian sphere.

H0803-0063

7.) Were about 230,000 hectares of pasture-land and meadow ploughed up mainly for potato acreage?

A.) Yes, potatoes and turnips (raps).

8.) Was it chiefly these measures which made it possible to continue feeding the Dutch population up to the middle of 1944, in spite of the blockade?

A.) Yes, in combination with the limiting of the cattle stocks, adjusting the stocks to the actual supplies of cattle fodder.

9.) Were the coal-miners in Limburg given extra food rations equal to the minimum food ration received by miners in the Reich, so as to obtain an increase in the production of coal, about half of which was to be used for the production of nitrogen for Dutch agriculture?

A.) There was the intention of even exceeding the German rations. As a result of objections from German authorities in Belgium and France and in the Reich, ours had to remain a little below the German rations.

As far as I remember indeed almost the whole of the additional production of 35,000 - 40,000 tons per month thus obtained, was to be used for the production of nitrogen.

H0803-0064

10.) Did the Reich Commissar assign this work to the Sluiskil works which were, however, destroyed by British air attacks?

A.) Yes.

11.) Did the Reich Commissar, by personal application to the Fuehrer, obtain the exceptional assignment of iron and cement for the development of the North East Polders, although this ran counter to the armament requirements?

A.) Yes, over and above this we received from Germany among other things 65 heavy caterpillar tractors, crude oil, petrol etc. for the North East Polders. Special deliveries for the spring tilling even in March 45.

12.) Did the Reich Commissar make any efforts to keep the food rations in Holland on a level with those in the Reich as far as possible, was the Main Food Department therefore concerned with keeping down the demands of the Reich?

A.) Yes, the continual conflicts with the various Reich Offices and other interested parties in Germany, on the subject of Dutch Agriculture and Food Economy and feeding the Dutch, brought the Main Department for Food and Agriculture and the individual advisors into discredit, even with their offices in their own country.

H0803-0065

13.) Were the normal weekly rations in the middle of 1944 1800 gr. of bread, 70 gr. of flour, 150 gr. of prepared foods, 250 gr. of sugar, 125 gr. of jam, 125 gr. of meat, 146 gr. of butter, 50 gr. of cheese, 3 kg of potatoes, 1 3/4 litres of milk?

A.) The rations are stated correctly. The potato ration even amounted to 4 kilogrammes, a considerable number of the population received extra amounts in addition to these 4 kilogrammes, young people etc., that is up to 2 kgs.

14.) What is the calory value of these rations?

A.) I no longer remember the exact calory value but it can easily be established from the appropriate tables. If my memory does not deceive me, it amounted to approx. 1800 calories.

15.) Did not heavy laborers, children, expectant and nursing mothers receive extra rations?

A.) Yes, there were even more special rations, i.e. for people working long hours and nights, sick people, young people etc.

16.) Was not the food situation in the country and in country towns further improved for at least half the Dutch population by the extra supply of food, especially milk, potatoes and vegetables?

H0803-0066

A.) Yes, self suppliers had considerably better rations than those mentioned above, the produce from their own gardens was free up to a certain definite quantity, similarly they could keep goats and rabbits, which did not have to be given up and were not counted.
Land was made available to many households for allottments and, in addition, seed and manure.

17.) In Addition to this were not communal and works kitchens set up, which fed about 800,000 people daily, extra food being made available for this purpose?

A.) Yes, but normally only approx. 500,000 portions were given out.

18.) Were there not enough cattle for the meat rations to be distributed under all circumstances up to the end (May 1945), without essentially reducing the number of cattle?

A.) There were enough cattle. The removal of cattle on a large scale as demanded by the Wehrmacht, cattle treks, was refused. It would have led to the ruination of Dutch cattle breeding.

19.) Was not the agricultural production so organized that the highly valuable Dutch cattle-breeding industry was not jeopardised?

H0803-0067

Had the number of cattle dropped, at the end, to about 25% of the total number, although large quantities of feeding stuffs were brought in before May 1940?

A.) Yes, great care was taken that breeding stocks were protected and maintained, not only in the case of cattle but also pigs and poultry and therefore sacrifices made. The poultry farms received, for example, about as much fodder as the Wehrmacht did oats for their horses. The stocks of horses were increased, much to the annoyance of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Office for Animals in Berlin, the percentage for cattle is approximately correct, pigs and poultry were more severely limited.

20.) Were the Jews' rations different from those of the rest of the population and to what extent?

A.) No, the cards it is true were specially marked, under strong pressure from General Commissar SCHMIDT, who was later killed in an accident. The possibility was to be created of excluding Jews from special distributions. As far as I remember, however, this was never carried out. I remember only one occasion when this question threatened to become practicable, but it was possible to get round it.
(see also above under 3).

H0803-0068

C 21.) Were the demand for and the transport of food supplies in May - June 1944 dealt with under the Four Year Plan or by the offices of the Reich Commissar?

A.) Under the Four Year Plan.

22.) Was not the Reich Commissar continually striving for and did he not also gain permission from Reich Minister BAKE for Holland to deliver 200,000 tons of vegetables, as the settled nutritive equivalent, in return for the 36,000 tons of grain supplied from the Reich for the occupation troops, and that foodstuffs (especially wheat) to the same nutritive value should be delivered in return for all other foods delivered to the Reich (vegetables, pulses, potatoes and meat)?

A.) Yes.

23.) According to information given by the Dutch Government, 600,000 pigs, 275,000 head of cattle and 30,000 tons of canned meat were delivered during the 5 years of the occupation. Do these figures exceed by 5 - 10% the total production of pigs and cattle for those 5 years?

H0803-0069

A.) I no longer remember the figures, but as stated and in this context they give a distorted picture. Are the deliveries made under the 1942 Mast Agreement with the Reich Office for Animals, in Berlin included in the Dutch figures? The deliveries of meat were high in comparison with the other deliveries and we made concessions indeed in this matter to the 4 Year Plan and Reich Ministry for Food, on the grounds of negotiation tactics. The nutrition of the Dutch population was not so badly affected as the actual figures would lead one to suppose. If one were to calculate for instance by how much percent the Dutch rations could have been increased, if the deliveries had been halved or had not been made at all, the percentage would be between 10-15%. Neither the calory nor the psychological effect would have been of any account, had it been possible to increase the meat ration from 125 grammes to say 140 grammes.

D24.) Did not the Reich Commissar always denounce the black market trade in food, even in German circles? Did the Reich Commissar close the so-called "Schlemmerlokale" (Gluttony-inns) because they encouraged the black market trade and gave a false picture of the food situation in Holland?

H0803-0070

A.) The answer to all three questions is yes !

25.) Did the Reich Commissar repeatedly and publicly urge the Dutch to put an end to the black market trade in food by not buying food in the black market?

A.) If I remember correctly yes, Without doubt the Reich Commissar condemned black market trade and repeatedly urged that it should be combatted.

E 26.) At the time of the employment drives of 1942/3, was the distribution of option permits left to the Dutch authorities who, in the food industry alone, distributed 600,000 of these permits.

A.) Yes, but I believe the figure was between 450,000 and 500,000.

27.) Were these permits based on the option, even at the time of the drive carried out by the Armed Forces in 1944/45?

A.) Yes.

28.) Were there not at least 100,000 "divers" (Untertaucher) working in Dutch agriculture, who had escaped compulsory employment? Did the Reich Commissar know of this?

H0803-0071

Did he not institute investigation measures so that these workers might be employed in agriculture?

A.) Yes applies for all three questions.

F 29.)Were the inundations and flooding exclusively preparations for defense by the Armed Forces? Had the Reich Commissar and his authorities influence in this matter only in so far as he made efforts to keep the inundated area as small as possible and arranged for the inhabitants and supplies to be removed?

A.)My answer to both questions is yes ! I can even remember that plans for flooding on the largest possible scale in Northern and Southern Holland were cancelled after a statement by the Reich Commissar, on the occasion of a conference on questions of flooding made as a result of his representations at the Fuehrer's H.Q. I think there is no need for me to give any concrete details for the time being.

30.) Was the originally intended area of about 100,000 hectares reduced, by half through this influence, was primarily the less destructive fresh-water flooding put into operation and the outer dykes against the open sea nowhere destroyed?

H0803-0072

A.) The areas to be flooded were reduced considerably through the intervention of the Reich Commissar. I would not like to quote figures from memory. The Wehrmacht repeatedly altered and reduced plans for military positions in accordance with objections expressed by the Reich Commissar or by his authorities, on his orders. The outer dykes were not destroyed to my knowledge. The Wehrmacht was repeatedly induced by the Reich Commissar and his authorities to refrain from weakening the dykes by building military positions, or to repair them.

G 31.) Did the Reich Commissar support the work of the International Swedish and Swiss Red Cross as far as he could?

A.) Yes !

32.) Were General Secretary HIRSCHFELD and General Director LOWES able to confer privately with the director of the work, the Swedish Count MOERNER?

A.) As far as I know, yes !

33.) Were the German civilian population in Holland forbidden to draw these food-stuffs? Did they not have to return the relevant sections of the card to the office which supplied the cards ?

H0803-0073

A.) Yes, the return of the sections of the cards in question to the office which supplied the cards (German NSV) was not carried out however, to my knowledge, for technical reasons.

34.) Did the Reich Commissar request Count MOERNER to arrange that these deliveries might be continuous and to the extent of 20,000 tons of high value food-stuffs per week?

A.) At least the Reich Commissar gave an order in this connection to Bern, representative of the Foreign Office or to the liaison officer to the International Red Cross, Medizinalrat REUTER.

35.) Were these consignments taken over from the Dutch Food Organization direct so that they did not come into German hands at all?

A.) Yes!

H 36.) Was the Dutch Provincial Diet (Landstand) a party organization under the leadership of MUSSERT, the head of the NSB?

A.) Not de jure !

37.) Was there a certain readiness among Dutch farmers, especially in Seeland and Groningen, for a unified Dutch Farmers organization?

H0803-0074

A.) Yes ! The Dutch Director Genèral for Agriculture, ROEBROK, once requested me to form a unified Organization, naturally before the Dutch Provisional Diet (Landstand) was founded.

38.) Were the contributions compulsory?

A.) Yes!

39.) Did the Landstand have official duties, e.g. settling of the delivery quotas, allotting of seed, manures etc.? Or were these duties carried out by the Dutch authorities (General Director LOWES etc.)?

A.) Yes, it was given duties which gave it a certain importance outwardly and to itself, but did not make it possible for it to intervene in the State Food Organization. The functions described were carried out by the official machinery, the Landstand could act only in this connection in an advisory capacity.

I 40.) Did a shipping strike break out in September 1944, about the same time as the Railway strike, so that, except for a few food ships, neither the railway nor the inland shipping was functioning in Holland?

H0803-0075

A.) No, the seamen did not strike but, in practice, they did not sail. Where possible they hid their ships because they were afraid that these would be requisitioned by German authorities (Wehrmacht) and they would be forced to sail to Germany.

41.) Did the Armed Forces announce that, above all, their transport requirements must be assured and that they must secure the necessary shipping space as long as the extent of future railway traffic was uncertain?

A.) Yes, in addition to shipping space needed for transportation purposes, the Wehrmacht as far as I know, also secured barge space for special purposes, I believe e.g. for bridge building, a great deal of barge space was also claimed by the FIEBIG authorities for goods which were being sent out of the country (Raeumungsgueter).

42.) Does the witness know that the Armed Forces requisitioned all the shipping space they could, including food ships with cargoes?

A.) According to my observations, the Wehrmacht requisitioned ships everywhere without any plan, on various occasions also food ships with cargoes. The ban on sailing by day (danger of air attack) and similar things put a great restriction on the transportation of food stuffs.

H0803-0076

43.) Was the food situation in the provinces of Holland at the end of September 44 such that from the harvest of each province, food for about 10 - 12 weeks was assured, with meat, milk and sometimes with fats and potatoes for even longer?

A.) Yes, the harvest in the Western Provinces, together with the stocks already collected against the winter and against "catastrophies" were to have lasted that long, as was the cattle stock or rather the supply of fattened beasts. The problem however was the mobilizing, threshing of the harvest and local traffic.

44.) Can the period of frost, which stopped imports by sea, normally be expected not to start before Christmas and to last about 6 weeks?

A.) Before Christmas the Dutch did not reckon with long periods of frost influencing shipping seriously. They had left themselves that much time in previous years for getting in the potato stocks for the winter. A period of 6 weeks frost counts as unusually long in the West.

45.) Could it be expected that, from the middle of October onwards, 25,000 tons of food-stuffs could be imported to Holland, weekly when the transport system was functioning, so that sufficient food-stuffs would be available for the period of frost?

HO803-0077

A.) It would and should have been possible to transport even greater quantities.

46.) General Director LOWES has stated that the witness (v.d.WENSE) asked him (LOWES) and General Secretary HIRSCHFELD, in the name of the Reich Commissar, to influence the rail workers to end the strike, as otherwise the Reich Commissar would place an embargo on shipping on the Iysselmeer. Did the Reich Commissar tell the witness (v.d.WENSE) that, should the strike continue, the needs of the Armed Forces must first of all be assured before civilian traffic could be taken into consideration?

A.) Yes, but I would like to emphasize that, during the conference in question after the outbreak of the Railway Workers Strike, the suggestion of placing an embargo on foodstuffs came from General Commissioner RAUTER or from FIEBIG. In any case both of them were in favour of it, FIEBIG particularly strongly and, from the impression gained the Reich Commissar did not abruptly turn down this plan but at heart would readily have rejected it. (See under 48).

47.) Did the Reich Commissar maintain traffic in the province of Holland with small vessels which were no good to the Armed Forces, at any rate not in the Iysselmeer, and did he instruct the police to prevent such ships being requisitioned?

A.) Yes.

H0803-0078

48.) About the middle of October, when the requirements of the Armed Forces were assured, did the Reich Commissar ive the order that inland shipping was to be restarted?

A.) Yes, the Reich Commissar himself carried out the dec ive negotiations with the competent Wehrmacht Authorities.

49.) Did this traffic not restart because the Dutch Traffic authorities (Waterstaat, Vervoerwesen) were not working and their director, HANRAT, had disappeared?

A.) Waterstaat refused and HANRAT was not here. There were however also other reasons for delay in restarting shipping and the unsatisfactory output up to April, see e.g. under I 40;41;42.

50.) Was a special committee set-up, the suggestion of the Reich Commissar, under the chairmanship of General Secretary HIRSCHFELD, Central Shipping Company, was General Secretary HIRSCHFELD given special full powers in dealing with traffic affairs?

A.) Yes.

H0803-0079

51.) Was it several weeks - until about the second half of November - before shipping was restarted?

A.) Yes.

52.) Did the Reich Commissar give the committee all the assistance he could - supplying coal, preventing the requisitioning of ships and tugs by the Armed Forces etc?

A.) Yes.

53.) Were nearly 200,000 tons of food-stuffs brought into Holland in this way?

A.) The quantities of food-stuffs despatched to Holland in this manner were considerable, but I can no longer give the exact figures from memory.

54.) During the period of frost, did the Reich Commissar arrange for potato trains, run by German railway personnel, to reach the cities of Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, for the communal kitchens?

A.) Yes, but only insufficient quantities could be despatched.

H0803-0080

55.) Did the Reich Commissar issue instructions that extra food-stuffs for 250,000 children were to be brought to the cities by German transport?

A.) I cannot answer yes without reservations, in any case he repeatedly urged that for instance butter should be obtained from the East and North for the children in the cities. Subsequently, in the interests of the civilian population, the demands of the Armed Forces were not met and there were strong complaints.

56.) Does the witness know that on account of the traffic conditions, the Armed Forces requisitioned food-stuffs all over Holland to meet their requirements and did the Reich Commissar and/or his authorities continually attempt to regain these stores to feed the civilian population?

A.) Yes, a considerable part of the work of my Main Department and of the Agricultural leaders, who were subordinate to me was, from Sept 44 onwards, fighting against these requisitions etc.

57.) Does the witness (v.d.WENSE) know anything about the requisitioning of 30,000 tons of wheat in Northern Holland during that time?

H0803-0081

A.) Probably this refers to the delivery of 30,000 tons of bread-grain for the Wehrmacht from the Northern Provinces of Holland, this being a tax levied. At the time in question, the Wehrmacht ostensibly had no stocks of bread-grain or flour at its disposal and wished to or in consequence of an OKW order regarding "utilization of the country" was to get supplies of bread-grain from Holland. Upto that time, the necessary flour had been supplied from Germany in consideration of the task of supplying the civilian population. After considerable differences of opinion between the more or less competent Authorities of the Wehrmacht, the 4 Year Plan and the Reich Ministry of Food regarding the "utilization of the country", agreement was reached in general and also on this question, in that these 30,000 tons at first should be supplied from the North Eastern Provinces. For this the Wehrmacht renounced any claim to bread-grain from the Western Provinces, in the interests of the Dutch population being supplied, and promised that larger stocks requisitioned, for example in Amsterdam and Rotterdam would be released. Reich Minister BACKE at the same time made himself responsible for seeing that these quantities were returned in plenty of time before the new harvest. (see also under 5 further above).

58.) Did the Dutch Food authorities demand the banning of irregular methods of obtaining food-stuffs in the East of Holland, so that the orderly bringing up of supplies was not interferred with by the buying up of goods by women and girls from the province of Holland?

H0803-0082

A.) I cannot with certainty assert whether the Dutch made this demand officially, but I can remember that the Food Commissars for the Northern Provinces during general discussions described this ban as desirable and that the Dutch Authorities willingly co-operated after it was introduced.

59.) Did the Reich Commissar refuse this demand until the period of frost was over and it was again possible to import across the Iysselmeer, that is until 1st March 1945?

A.) Yes, but I cannot guarantee the date.

60.) Does the witness know that, when the period of frost began, the Reich Commissar asked the Military Commander to suspend the operation of seizing all members of the Dutch population who where capable of bearing arms (the so-called man-hunt (Menschenfangaktion)) and that the Commander-in-Chief had granted this request?

A.) I cannot remember with any certainty, but I would sooner say yes than no.

In conclusion I believe I should point out, in elaboration of my statements to 3, that the extent of the support and the protection which the Reich Commissar gave the Dutch Agriculture and Food Economy, in particular, General Director LOWES and the authorities and organizations subordinate to him,

H0803-0083

in the interests of assuring the feeding of the Dutch people, is in the above only sketchily mentioned. Equally within these bounds it was possible only to touch upon the extent and how strongly the Reich Commissar thereby opposed the "Lord and Master attitude" in the extensive and authoritative German circles.

signed: VON DER WENSE.

P.O.W. Camp 2221.
7 April 46.

I hereby certify that the above is the signature of VON DER WENSE.

I herewith certify that the copy of the interrogatory and answer sheet Von Der WENSE is a verbatim copy of the text available to me.

(Dr. Gustav STEINBAUER)

H0803-0084

10 June 1946

We, E. M. WITT, Civ., 274674, and WANDA S. TIESZEN, Civ., X 046265, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document.

E. M. WITT
Civ., 274674

WANDA S. TIESZEN
Civ., X 046265.

H0803-0085

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании Трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0803-0086

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No. 108

Defense Exhibit No.

Investigation Bureau (Division for Political Cases) - Rotterdam.

Telephone 25370 (6 lines) CRISPIJNLAAN 104

No. WP/B L. 3004/612 Post Office Box No. 89[illegible]

In replies state file symbols

ROTTERDAM .

1 May 1946.

Subject: Director Dirk Hannema
(Dutch citizen)
Director of the Boymans - Museum
in Rotterdam until May 1945.

1. Were works of art, paintings etc. ever removed from public museums (for instance the Rijksmuseum, Mauritshuis, Boymans - Museum) by the occupational authorities?

No. Only in one case (the Kroeller-Mueller-Foundation in Henderlo) were three old German paintings removed, namely a Venus by H. Baldung. Grien, a Venus by Lucas Cranach and the portrait of a man by Barthel Bruin. Later the sum of 600.000 Dutch florins was paid for these pictures. (At that time this amount seemed to be quite a considerable one This occurred in 1941.

2. Did the Security Police once make an attempt at removing some pictures from the Boymans-Museum as "degenerated art"?

Such pictures were not removed from the Boymans-Museum but from the museum in Dordrecht. They were drawings and lithographic prints by Jan Veth which represented the painter Joseph Israels.

H0803-0087

3. Did the Reich Commissioner order these pictures to be brought back to the museum?

Through my intervention the Reich Commissioner ordered the pictures to be brought back.

4. Were the world famous paintings from the Dutch Museum stored in a bunker on the coast?

Yes.

5. Did the Reich Commissioner recommend the Dutch authorities concerned not to remove the pictures from the fortified coastal area?

I am not aware of it.

6. Did the Dutch authorities not build, therefore, an excellent underground shelter in the town-hall of Maastricht where these pictures remained until the end under Dutch control and guard exclusively?

Yes, in "Pietersberg" near Maastricht.

7. Do you know that the Reich Commissioner rejected a request from the Reich (Dr. Goebbels) to bring these pictures into the Reich?

I am not aware of it.

8. Did the Reich Commissioner make it possible for the Dutch Government to acquire a newly discovered, very interesting picture by Vermeer van Delft (Maria Magdalena washing the feet of Christ) although the Reich was interested in this picture?

H0803-0088

Yes; I know that because I was a member of the committee which was formed especially for this purpose.

9. Did you belong to the committee which the Reich Commissioner had entrusted with the work of sorting out from the confiscated royal property everything that in view of its historical and cultural value was to remain in Holland?

Yes.

10. Did the Reich Commissioner give his full consent to the proposals made

The committee had the impression that the Reich Commissioner was on the whole accessible to the proposals of the committee.

11. Were the following principles laid down?

a) The Dutch Government was to take over all buildings and other real estate with the exception of two small unimportant rented apartment houses in Friesland.

b) Also all accessories of any value.

c) The list of the houses was to be handed over to the Dutch Governmen

d) The personal effects of the royal family (clothes, linen etc., family souvenirs, approximately 400 pictures which the Queen had painted herself) were to be stored for it?

I believe that all these principles were laid down in this manner.

12. Among the items selected in this way were there different souvenirs of the union of the houses of Orange and Brandenburg?

H0803-0089

13. Did high-placed Reich Offices express the wish to obtain these articles fo the Reich?

14. Did the Reich Commissioner prev nt that?

Answers to 12-13-14: I do not ecall this special case. The committee al tried to prevent such procedure and in so far as I could draw conclusions from the result, the Reich Com ssioner readily lent an ear in such cases.

15. Among the items sorted-out was here any valuable furniture of historical and cultural interest from the Eastern wing and middle building of the castle in Soestdijk? Did the Reich Commissioner give the order for this furniture to be handed over to the Dutch Government?

I believe that is true.

16. Were the proceeds from the sale of these items to be used for the purposes of a Dutch foundation?

I do not know.

17. Did the actual realization, i.e. by sale to third parties or hiring out amount to more than at the most 5% of the total value?

I do not know.

(signed) Dr. Hannema.

I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of the original in my possession.

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer.)

H0803-0090

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No. 108

Defense Exhibit No.

POLITICAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT - ROTTERDAM

Telephone: 25370 (6 lines)

No. Secretariat

WP/B1-0605-626

Rotterdam.

7 May 1946.

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS DR. D. H A N N E M A , DIRECTOR OF THE BOYMANS-MUSEUM IN ROTTERDAM (EXAMINATION APPROVED OF BY THE TRIBUNAL FOR THE DEFENDANT SEYSS-INQUART).

1. Did the occupational authorities remove from the Reich Museum in Amdam a painting by Rembrandt belonging to a Jew and the collection Ofenheim(Gobelins from Leiden), and a collection Jaffe (paintings) an from the Museum in Rotterdam a collection of drawings belonging to Mr. Koenigs, Haarlem?

Inreply to the first three questions: Yes.

In answer to the last question: Only 1/3 of Dr. Koenig's former collection of drawings was sold.

2. Do you know whether the occupational authorities made a so-called purchase of the painting "The Peacocks" by Rembrand from the Reich Museum (National Gallery) in Amsterdam and (a so-called purchase) of an important and extremely valuable painting by Terborch from the Mauritschuis in The Hague?

Yes. But not from the National Gallery in Amsterdam, nor from the Mauritschuis in The Hague, but from private collectors who had loaned these important paintings to the museums mentioned.

H0803-0091

3. Did the German authorities take away works of art and paintings etc. which were the property of the Dutch Government, of private persons and above all of Jews?

Yes.

4. Do you know if the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart summoned his friend Dr. Muhlmann to Holland?

Yes.

5. Do you know in what capacity Dr. Muhlmann worked? Was he not an expert in the field of works of art?

Yes.

6. Did he not organize the looting of works of art in Holland?

Yes.

7. Do you know that with the help of Muhlmann as an agent works of art and paintin were obtained for the Fuehrer, for Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart, Governor General H. Frank in Cracow and for the Gauleiter of Vienna, Baldur von Schirach?

I am not aware of it.

8. Is it true that Seyss-Inquart's easing of regulations regarding foreign currency and travel made it possible for a great number of German art deale to buy vast quantities of works of art, paintings etc. in Holland?

Yes.

H0803-0092

9. Do you know whether Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart repeatedly suggested to the Fuehrer that the latter should give him permission to confiscate normal property including works of art on behalf of the German Reich?

No.

10. Do you know if this permission was given the Reich Commissioner by the Fuehrer after a radio address by the Queen of Holland on 27 June 1941?

No.

11. Do you know that by virtue of this permission the greater part of the works of art which were the property of the royal family was stolen and brought to Germany?

No.

No.

12. Do you know that as a further result of this permission numerous extremely important pieces from the archives of the Royal House of Orange-Nassau were shipped to Germany?

No.

In concluding I wish to state that during the war I worked only as a museum expert and that the answerss to the questions asked above must be considered exclusively from this point of view.

Hoek of Holland.
7 May 1946.
signed: D. Hannema
(Dr. D. Hannema.)

H0803-0093

I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of the original in my possession

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer.)

H0803-0094

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No. 109

Defense Exhibit No.

N.R.C. 10/8 : 42

Proclamation.

Following his proclamation of 13 July 1942 to the entire Dutch population, which was published by all Dutch newspapers, the following is officially announced by order of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, General of the Air Force, Fr.Christiansen:

On 7 August, irresponsible elements made an attempt to damage a train of the German Wehrmacht in Rotterdam. A Dutch railroad official, while fulfilling his duty, became a victim of this attempt. If the perpetrators do not report to the police or if they cannot be determined chiefly through the assistance of the inhabitants of the country before Friday 14 August at midnight, action by virtue of the proclamation of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, will be taken against a certain number of hostages who will answer with their lives for such acts of sabotage. Thus, arresting the perpetrators is in the interest of the whole population in order to prevent that action be taken against the hostages.

The Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands fixes a reward of 100,000 Guilders for information furnished in time to agencies of the German Wehrmacht and police, which may lead to the seizure of the perpetrators. Information will be treated confidentially.

The Higher SS and Police Leader
and General Commissioner for Security
Rauter.
Lt. General of the Police.

H0803-0095

I hereby certify that the above copy corresponds exactly to the text in my possession.

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer)

H0803-0096

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No.110

Defense Exhibit No.

N.R.C. 17/5 ' 42

It is officially announced.

The death sentences which the German courts martial had to pass these days against a group of saboteurs of the security of the occupying power and which, meanwhile, have been carried out, have spoken a language which cannot be misunderstood.

The course of the trial furnished the unequivocal evidence that the irresponsible exciting slogans from across the Channel are still finding willing tools among certain small parts of the population, who in their unlimited infatuation do not shrink back from activities, through which they must logically come into conflict with the occupation authorities. Since all admonitions and warnings apparently did not help, the occupying power saw itself compelled to take the necessary preventive measure against a repetition of such plots.

460 persons, who were formerly figures in public life and of whom one can assume that they sympathize with the instigators of these activities aimed at the occupying power, were arrested as hostages.

Hardly a day passes without the London radio addressing tirades of abuse with the threat of death to Dutchmen and Germans in the occupied territories. Elements, who in their blind thoughtlessness should give way to be the instruments of anti-national elements who themselves are living at a safe distance, must know that they are not

playing an infamous game with their own life but also with the lives of those hostages, the outcome of which cannot be doubted by any more or less intelligent person.

If due to the machinations of the emigrant clique in London, acts of violence against Dutchmen and Germans are committed in the occupied Dutch territories and if law and order should be disturbed, then the hostages will answer with their lives for it.

I hereby certify that the above copy corresponds exactly to the original in my possession.

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer)

H0803-0097

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No.111

Defense Exhibit No.

Answers to questions to Kleffel, General of the Cavalry.

Prisoner of War No. A 461 162.226 P.O.W. Camp B.A.O.R. via Hannover.

1.) From 27 March 1945 to 8 April 1945 I acted for the Commander of the 25th Army in the Netherlands.

2.) In those days, I discussed with Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart the possibility of defending the fortress of Holland and the consequences of such a fight.

3.) It is correct that Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart sent by courier, with my agreement, a letter to the Fuehrer, in which he pointed out that in case of a military defense of the fortress of Holland

a) severe damage would necessarily be inflicted on the country and its population through the unavoidable effects of war, besides,

b) within the shortest time a catastrophic starvation would set in for the population.

4.) We agreed that it would serve the general situation better to evacuate Holland and to

H0803-0098

H0803-0099

utilize the German forces stationed in Holland, in the Reich, and that the military advantages did not warrant a defense of the fortress of Holland.

Kleffel
General of Cavalry
PW No. A 461 162 226
P.O.W. Camp B.A.O.R.
via Hannover

Copy certified by:

(sgd. Gustav Steinbauer.)

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No.112

Defense Exhibit No.

Sandbostel 21 May 1946

Erwin Tzschoppe
Camp Number 205972
2. C.I.C., Sandbostel

STATEMENT

As SS Standartenfuehrer and later as SS Oberfuehrer, I was from February 1943 to 5 September 1944 commander of the defensive area Scheveningen and from 5 September to the end of November 1944 commander of the coasta defense sector North (Holland). Owing to these positions, I had many conferences with the then Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart, who was also living in my defensive area.

I can testify the following:

1) The former Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart hardly ever took any authoritative decisions in matters concerning the constal area, only in important cases after hearing the experts in charge, the commanders etc.

2) The Reich Commissioner set great value on preserving the aspect of the city of The Hague and Scheveningen and on the preservation of the houses. Thus, the maintenance of the Koninginngracht, despite the contrary opinion of high

H0803-0100

military agencies, was probably his achievement. Through the intervention of agencies of the Reich Commissioner (Dr. Bergfeld) and in order to make construction materials available for flanking bunkers, i was decided not to carry out this plan. By means of conferences, the Reich Commissioner also prevented the demolition of the 200 buildings in The Hague.

3) The Reich Commissioner always arranged for tolerant Dutchmen not to b evacuated from the coastal area.

4) Every application, verbal or written, for the visiting of an empty house in the coastal area was authorized by instructions from the Reich Commissioner.

5) By order of the Reich Commissioner, the Dutch welfare organization wa authorized to cultivate all fields and gardens within the fortificati zone.

6) The first care of the Reich Commissioner was to establish big food dep and central kitchens in the fortification area in order to supply the civilian population in case of attack.

7) By an order of the Reich Commissioner evacuations were never unduly r but the persons concerned received notice 4 weeks ahead and they coul take everything along with them.

8) In order to prevent any kind of plundering of empty houses, the follo ing protective measures were taken at the instance of the Reich Commissioner:

H0803-0101

The Dutch police was employed in sufficient quantity in the fortificatic area and suffered no hindrance.

At the same time German military police supervised the behavior of the soldiers.

9) On the whole it must be said that the Reich Commissioner took care of ev detail which concerned the civilian population and he interested himself personally in providing it with shelter and food.

I certify in lieu of oath the accuracy of this statement. It is intended to be produced before the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg.

Certified true copy

Dr. Gustav Steinbaue

H0803-0102

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No.113

Defense Exhibit No.

Adalbert Joppich

Camp Number 203235

2.C.I.C., Sandbostel

Sandbostel, 21 May 1946.

STATEMENT

As former chief of the German supreme tribunal in the Netherlands I can testify, as far as my field of work is concerned, that the then Reich-Commissioner Seyss-Inquart always most carefully examined the affairs of the Dutch civilian population, especially also the sentences which were submitted to him for his decision in questions of pardon. Time and again the Reich Commissioner instructed his agencies to work in the most scrupu way and with the threat that all mistakes would be punished.

I realized through personal conversations, that the Reich Commissioner had/to come to appreciate the ways of the Dutch people and the Dutch culture to an unusually degree, and he could, for instance, talk for hours about Dutch art with Dutch professors.

We all of us feel that he carried out his office conscientiously and without reproach.

Adalbert Joppich.

H0803-0103

H0803-0104

I certify in lieu of oath the accuracy of this statement. It is destined for production before the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg.

Adalbert Joppich

Certified true copy

Dr. Gustav Steinbauer

Dr. Seyss—Inquart No. 114

Defense Exhibit No.

Testimony of Gero R e u t e r , M.D.

1 Fillberg, Wildeshausen in Oldenburg.

taken by Major Sykes, 821, L/R Mil. Gov.Det., Special Branch, on 18 June 1946 at 1060 hours.

I was told by Major Sykes and I understand that my statement may be used as evidence.

In replying to a questionnaire which I read, I gave the enclosed testimony, marked "A". This testimony is true and was signed by me in the presence of Major Sykes. The following are answers to the questions which Major Sykes asked me:

1 a) I am German.

b) I was ordered to Holland from the Reich Ministry of the Interior in Berlin at the instance of State Secretary Dr. Conti, chief of the Health Department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

c) Before I was chief of the Health Department in the Oldenburg State Ministry.

2 a) A parallel situation for that time is not known to me.

b) I only know that in the last twenty years the Dutch population had grown from 6.6 to 8.8 millions in 1939. In other words, there was an increase of some 100,000 inhabitants per year. Such an increase also existed during the period of occupation until 1944.

H0803-0105

H0803-0106

2 b)

a) I could only answer this question if I had the statistical data befor

2 e)

a) I cannot answer this question without examining the statistical data.

2 f)

a) On the whole conditions were satisfactory. There was, however, an increase in scarlet fever and diphtheria as well as in venereal diseas and tuberculosis.

a) Since September 1944 traffic and thereby shipping was disorganized so that food transports could not be sent from the Eastern parts of the country to the densely populated western parts and big cities; so that in the large cities particularly a serious famine developed to which primarily many old and sick people but also babies succumbed. Besides, in one part of the Dutch country there was military action.

11

a) Karrel P i c k was the Secretary General of the Dutch Red Cross now appointed by the Reich Commissioner.

b) I knew that he did not support the Mussert movement, but he was closel connected with German ideas on National-Socialism. As a Dutchman he could not be a member of the party.

c) To my knowledge in the years 1941 and 42 he was chief of the Netherla Winter Aid Organization; he was dismissed.

d) I have heard that difficulties were said to have existed in the financ administration. I do not know to what extent that is true. I myself was informed that Mr. Pick's conduct was irreproachable.

e) I knew Baron van Lynden as one of the directors of the

Dutch Red Cross; Dr. Offerhaus of The Hague should be better informed abo the work of the Dutch Red Cross since during the war years until 1944 he was the Secretary General of the Dutch Red Cross and as such always gave active cooperation.

12,13,14

a) The first ships to enter Delfzyl were the Swedish steamers "Noreg" and "Dalgmar Drat". These two ships arrived in Holland approximately between 20 and 30 January 1945.

b) Swedish and Swiss aid of the Red Cross Organizations of these countries was given during the period between January and May 1945. Preparations for these operations date back to the month of November 1944.

I have read this testimony and it is true.

Witness: /Da.Sykes/
Major

/Dr.Gero Reuter /

H0803-0107

"A"

Obermedizinalrat Geo[illegible] R o u t e r , M.D.,

1 Fillerberg, Wildeshausen in Oldenburg,

formerly Chief of the Department of Public Health of the Commissariat General for Administration and Justice with the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories.

A. 1) From July 1940 until May 1945 I was chief of the Department of Public Health in the Netherlands. I was ordered to Holland from the Reich Minist of the Interior in Berlin at the instance of State Secretary Dr. Conti, chief of the Health Department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Chief of the German Red Cross in the Netherlands, I was "Commissioner of the German Red Cross" from September 1941 on.

2) I do not recall having seen a report of the Dutch Health Office and Dutch Office for Statistics for the month of December 1944.

a) I knew of the decline in the increase of population from 1914 to 1918. Without data I can no longer say whether the decrease amounted to 50%.

b) I remember that during the period from 1940 to 1943 there was a regular increase in the population. It is certain that a decrease in the population did not take place.

c) The number of marriages increased during the period of occupation.

d) The Dutch population grew from 8.9 to about 9.2. - 9.3 millions during the period of occupation.

e) The mortality rate was about 10 per 1,000 inhabitants during the peri of occupation. During the period 1914 - 1918 there was a considerably higher mortality rate amongst the Dutch population. I can no longer give figures for the latter from memory.

H0803-0108

f) In the years from 1941 to 1943 very numerous cases of scarlet fever and diphtheria occurred in the Dutch population. The cases decreased in numbe again in 1944. The systematic use of prophylactic vaccinations can be considered as one of the causes for the decrease in the number of cases of these diseases.

g) Up to September 1944 the general conditions of the Dutch population as regards health and food were quite satisfactory. The chief inspector of Public Health, Dr. Banning, The Hague, as responsible head of the Dutch health organization also expressed the same opinion to me.

B.

3) I know the conditions of the Dutch Red Cross.

4) Through the Dutch Red Cross packages could be sent to the prisoners in the prisons and concentrationscamps in the Netherlands.

5) I know that a Dutch representative of the Dutch Red Cross - I do not know her name - had access to prisons and camps. She could speak to the prisoner and established, as it were, a liaison between the German authorities, the Dutch Red Cross and relatives of the inmates.

6) I did not speak to this lady personally. Neither do I know her.

7) I know nothing of this occurrence.

8) To my knowledge the activity of the trustee of the Dutch Red Cross was carried on until the end of 1944. Later on I heard no more about it.

H0803-0109

9) The Dutch Red Cross was included im the activity of the illegal resistance movement.

a) I heard of transports of weapons and persons in Dutch Red Cross vehicl

b) Messenger services for the resistance movement were said to have been organized by motorcyclists with Dutch Red Cross passes.

c) There was said to be an illegal radio station in the Red Cross Camp at Otterloo.

10) Prohibited instruments - files - are said to have been sent to the prisoners of war in food packages. I heard of it from a competent source in the Wehrmacht.

11) In view of the illegal occurrences in the Dutch Red Cross the Reich Commissi only appointed a new secretary general for the Dutch Red Cross.

12) As "Commissioner of the German Red Cross" I had to attend to the relief work of the Swedish and Swiss Red Cross for the starving population in th Dutch western provinces and in this work as Commissioner of the German Red Cross I also had to represent the Reich Commissioner.

13) The Reich Commissioner gave all possible help to this action. Bunker coal from German stocks was made available at that time especially for th steamers "Norreg", "Dalgmar Bratt" and "Hallaren".

14) Food and medicines arriving from Sweden and Switzerland were handed over without exception to the Dutch food authorities and supplied to the population by the Dutch state apparatus competent to deal with the distribution.

15) Permission was given to Secretary General Hirschfeld to speak privately to the Swedish delegate Count Bernadotte.

H0803-0110

H0803-0111

The letter, however, did not make use of this permission. Secretary General Lauwes had in my presence a long and detailed discussion with Count Moerner then abcard the steamer Hallaren. There was no permission for him to have a private talk.

16) According to a decree the Germans in the Netherlands were prohibited from sharing in the food gifts from Sweden and Switzerland. I no longer remember the regulations concerning ration cards.

17) At a personal discussion which I attended, Count Moerner, speaking on behalf of the President of the Swedish Red Cross, thanked the Reich Commissioner for his assistance, and expressed his recognition with particular cordiality. As far as I was concerned, the gratitude of the Swedish and Swiss delegates of these Red Cross Societies was expressed to me orally and in writing. I was awarded the Cross of Merit of the Swedish Red Cross on 4 April 1945 by the President of the Swedish Red Cross, His Royal Highness "Prince Karl of Sweden".

I have read this testimony and it is true.

Witness: /Da.Sykes/
Major

/ Dr. Gerc Reuter /

Enclosures:

1)	Letter of Count Moerner	dated	16 March 1945
2)	" " Prince Karl of Sweddn	"	4 April 1945
3)	" " Delegate Dr.W.Pfister	"	14 March 1945
4)	" " Delegate Pfeiffer	"	15 March 1945

M/S Hallaren, 16 March 1945

Doctor Gero Reuter

General Manager of the German Red Cross

Representative of the German Red Cross in the Netherlands

D e l f z i j l

Dear Doctor Reuter,

I gladly take this occasion on my second and perhaps last return trip to Sweden, to tell you in this letter how extraordinarily valuable your active cooperation has been in carrying out the Swedish Relief action on behalf of the Netherlands civilian population in Delfzijl.

You cooperated with me in every situation with the greatest understanding and good will for the benefit of the hungry Netherlands civilian population. With your skilful mediation you have helped us to get over many critical situations and you usually brought your negotiations to a satisfactory conclus If today, on my return to Sweden the first action is already working efficacio ly and if there are further plans for the distribution of food and medical supplies to bring great relief and aid in the near future to the hungry civili population of Westholland, then this is due to a great extent to your efforts, my dear doctor.

All these reasons move me to express to you herewith the due appreciation of the Swedish Red Cross and my own personal thanks. Moreover, it will be a pleasure for me to mention your very valuable cooperation in the above sense to the Presidency of the Swedish Red Cross and the competent agencies of the Royal Swedish Foreign Ministry in Stockholm.

H0803-0112

H0803-0113

I shall always remember your friendly cooperation and would consider it a great privilege if I were permitted to repay you for all the services you have shown me and the Swedish Red Cross. I am with pleasure at your service and with the expression of my highest esteem remain,

Your devoted

signed Count Hakon Moerner,

Red Cross Delegate.

Adr. Malevik, Drottningholm,

Sweden.

H0803-0114

Copy

Central Committee of the Swedish Red Cross

President:
His Royal Highness Prince Charles of Sweden.

Vice President:
Count F. Bernadotte Af Wisberg

General Secretary:
Lieutenant Colonel S. Rydmann

Artillerigatan 6.
Stockholm 14
Telephone: 623032
Telegram: "Humanitet

To the

General Director of the German Red Cross

in the Netherlands

Dr. Gerd R e u t e r M.D.

I have great pleasure, Doctor Reuter, in handing you through Captain Count Mörner, the Swedish Red Cross medal for distinguished service. This badge of merit will serve to remind you of the gratitude felt by the Swedish Red Cross and its President for the exceptionally valuable aid and assistance you have always rendered the Swedish Red Cross through its delegates in all its efforts to carry out Swedish Relief on behalf of the Netherlands.

Stockholm, 4 April 1945.

signed: C a r l
President of the Swedish
Red Cross, Prince van Sweden.

H0803-0115

C o p y

International Red Cross Committee
at Geneva

Delegation in Germany

Dear Doctor Reuter!

Before I leave Deldzijl, I wish to take the occasion to express to you my gratitude for all the assistance you have given me in the planning and execution of our Relief work on behalf of the three Western Provinces of Holland. Through your excellent knowledge of the country and people you acted as a mediator and go-between at all our meetings. It is to considerable extent due to you that good results can already be seen at the present time in organisation, transportation and distribution. Your good offices very often saved difficult situations so that suffering could be alleviated as quickly as possible in the West. Such well-meaning encouragement of our relief plans was most appreciable indeed, at this critical time when it was a question of days. Your suggestions and advice were actually very valuable to us not only as regards the distribution of medical supplies but in all questions of food distribution as well.

I shall make a point of including proper mention of your assistance in my reports to the Swiss Federal Council and the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva. I am authorized to express to you herewith the sincere appreciation of these two bodies, and I wish particularly to extend to you, dear Doctor Reuter, my own personal thanks. I shall be glad to repay your services in any way.

H0803-0116

With the expression of my profound esteem, I am

Yours,

Dr. W. Pfister

Delegate of the
International Red Cross
Committee, Geneva and
Representative of the
Swiss Relief for disabled
veterans, Bern, at present
in Delfzijl.

March 14, 1945

Director general of GRC
Dr. R e u t e r
At present in Delfzijl

H0803-0117

C o p y

International Red Cross Committee
Geneva,
Delegation in Germany.

Aboard M.S. "Henri Dunant"
15 March 1945

To Doctor Reuter, Director general of GRC
Delegate of the German Red Cross
in the Netherlands.
D e v e n t e r, at present Delfzijl

Dear Doctor Reuter,

Before I return to Switzerland, I consider it a great honor and pleasure to express to you my boundless appreciation and personal thanks for yo energetic and constructive cooperation in carrying out the "Swiss Relief for di abled veterans" in Bern, which was undertaken by order of the Swiss Government and the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, for the benefit of the distressed civilian population of Holland. I am fully aware that the smooth termination of this relief action depended largely on your activity and mediati

In the next relief action, as you know, it will presumably be Mr. Robert Haas who will bring the shipment from Goeteborg to Delfzijl, and I have no doubt that you will extend to him the same effective aid.

Thanking you again for the cooperation you have shown us in the spirit of the Red Cross, I remain dear Doctor,

Yours

sign. W. Pfeiffer

Delegate of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, at
present in Delfzijl.

I herewith certify that the above copies are true copies of the original before me.

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart No.115

Defense Exhibit No.

Document register No. 1796 / 46 K

T r a n s a c t e d

in this Hansa-town of Hamburg on July 4th (fourth) 1946 (Onethousand-Nine-Hundred andfortysix).

Before me, the undersigned notary

Dr. Herbert Kiesselbach,

offices in Hamburg, Boersenbruecke 2a, appeared today:

Dr. Arved B o l l e , port construction engineer, of

Hamburg - Fu., Heinrich Traunstrasse 8,

personally known to me

who, after I had pointed out the importance of an affidavit and the penalties resulting from a false affidavit, submitted the following statement in lieu of an oath, to be recorded by me:

I was born January 16th 1898 in Kassel and I am a German citizen.

A questionnaire is laid before me addressed to "Construction Director (Baudirektor) Bolle" (first name unknown) and containing 20 questions in reply, to which I wish to state the following.

1.) Were you in charge of the Main Traffic Section in the occupied Netherland territories until May 1945?

To 1) I am profession a port construction engineer, transferred to Holland as transportation officer in 1940 and was later assigned there by the Reich Ministry of Transportation "Waterways Plenipotentiary". I supervised the waterways in a technical capacity and was the intermediary between the Dutch and German inland navigation.

There were other representatives of the Reich Ministry of Transportation vested with equal authority for the departments of railroads

H0803-0118

H0803-0119

and local traffic..

During the course of war the ever-increasing traffic difficulties made a co-ordination of the means of transportation seem desirable in the beginning of 1944. I was charged with the execution, thereby becoming the head of the concentrated transportation, though railroads and local traffic were operated independently as before.

2.) Are you well informed on all matters concerning transportation facilities and on the conditions of the Netherland traffic system?

To 2) As the statements under 1) reveal, I am well informed about the conditions of the Dutch transportation facilities in regard to inland navigation owing to my jurisdiction, but only in general outlines about railroads and local traffic.

3.) In September 1944, at about the same time as the railroad strike, was there a sailors' strike too, so that apart from some of the food transport ships in the Netherlands, neither the railroads nor the inland shipping functioned?

To 3) Yes..

4.) Did the Wehrmacht inform the witness (Commander-in-chief of the Sea Transport-Command) that first of all her Wehrmacht requirements must be secured before there could be any civilian shipping, and that she must make sure of the shipping space she needed, as long as there was no certainly of the future extent of railroad traffic ?

To 4) In 1940 an Organization to maintain the flow of supplies for the Wehrmacht for War Transportation (directed by the German Navigation Office in Rotterdam) was organized, which stood in closest collaboration with the Dutch transportation agencies (Ministry for Inland Waterways and Freighting Commissars). That organization completely collapsed in September 1944 due to a strike in the inland navigation, at a time when the military situation put particularly heavy demands on inland shipping space. The Wehrmacht had therefore

H0803-0120

no other choice than to requisition the ships made idle by the strike, to man and to use them. The fleets thus created were operated among others by: The combat troops retreating at that time from Belgium via Seeland to Holland, the Admiral for the Netherlands (Chief of Sea Transportation), the headquarters for shipyards, the commander in chief of the Wehrmacht in Holland and others. In addition, the Chief of Transportation stepped in and dispatched to Holland an officer as Plenipotentiary Commissar for inland navigation, who on one side had to maintain the supplies for the army by way of inland navigation, and on the other hand to clear out ships from the area of operations.

In practice, therefore, when the strike set in, the entire Dutch inland navigation got into military hands and was thus withdrawn from the influence of the civilian administration and of the Reich Ministry of Transportation.

5.) Did the Wehrmacht at that time confiscate all shipping space and tugs within her reach including food ships with cargo?

To 5) After the accomplishment of point 4, the Wehrmacht seized all the shipping space and all the tug boats they needed. Whether there were ships with food cargoes among them is not known to me.

6.) Must one normally reckon that the frost period which disrupts shipping over the Ijsselsea, does not set in before Christmas and lasts about 6 weeks?

To 6) To my knowledge one can count on generally mild winters in Holland. Frost usually does not set in before Christmas. There are winters, during which navigation need not be discontinued at all.

7. Could one reckon that from the middle of October 1944, when the traffic system was in operation, 25 000 tons of food a week could be brought into Holland, that is therefore some 200 000 tons up to the beginning of the frost period?

To 7) Since up to the end of 1943 I had nothing to do at all with the railroads and in 1944 was occupied only for a few months with certain matters of coordination, nothing is known to me in regard to the total output of shipping in the preceding winters. I likewise have no knowledge as to whether in previous years any difficulties arose from the transportat situation in regard to food supplies in the Western part of the country. I do not believe so however.

8. Did the Reich Commissioner declare at that time (after the outbreak of the railroad and shipping strike) that if the strike continued, the needs of the Wehrmacht should be safeguarded in the first place, before the civilian traffic could be taken into consideration?

To 8) I know nothing about such a statement.

9.) Did the Reich Commissioner keep in operation within the province of Holland the traffic of small vessels which were of no use to the Wehrmacht, as well as on the Ijsselmer, informing the police to discontinue the seizu of such vessels?

To 9) I already stated under 4) that with the beginning of the strike, civilian control of the inland navigation ceased to exist. Conditions were different in each province and I also know that in certain parts of the country traffic on a limited scale was maintained by the Dutch. Details concerning the traffic within the province of Holland are unknown to me.

10.) Did the Reich Commissioner empower the witness around mid-October, whe the requirements of the Wehrmacht were ensured, to put inland navigation back into operation?

To 10) About the middle of October, the Reich Commissioner

H0803-0121

disclosed to me that he wanted to induce the Dutch to restore navigation in order to ship the food supply through the Yssel Sea, under the conditi that the Army and the Navy refrain from confiscating such ships. Both agr to respect, within the framework of the possibilites given to them, the certificates of safe conduct issued by the Plenipotentiary for Water Way

11.) Was not this navigation kept idle for some 3 weeks, because the Dutc traffic authorities (Ministry of Water Ways , Traffic Section) did not function and their leader Hanath had disappeared ?

To 11) After the prerequisities indicated under 10) were met, the Reich Commissar charged me to induce the Ministry for Water Ways to start the supply action which had to be carried out by Dutch ships, Dutch crews and under Dutch control. The Chief of the Traffic section in the Dutch Ministry for Water Ways, Dr. Hanath, was contemplated as the person to organize the project. The latter was invited by me to a discussion at my duty station (Hengeloh at that time) but disappeared on the way from Utrecht to Hengeloh and after a few days one had to consider his disappearance as an accomplished fact. A few more days elapsed before the traffic section, now deprived of its chief, could be made to function again. In my opinion the absence of Dr. Hanath who was a good traffic expert and organizer undoubtedly hampered the whole project.

12.) After a lapse of 3 weeks was there not formed by a directive of the Reich Commissioner a special committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary General Hirschfeld (Zentralreederei) and did not Hirschfeld receive special powers from the Reich Commissioner in the field of transportation.

To 12) In observing the action I noticed in addition to the many other difficulties which were due to circumstances, the following:

H0803-0122

a) The Ministry for Water Ways had no acting General Secretary, the traffic section had no chief, the subordinate officials, although willing, had not sufficient authority within the Dutch department.

b) It appeared that the direct traffic of big ships across the Yssel Sea caused less difficulties than the collecting traffic in the East and the distributing traffic in the West which had to be carried out by means of a very great number of small ships.

c) The distribution to the Western Sector of the food arriving in Amsterdam apparently caused difficulties.

In my opinion it is for these three reasons that Dr. Hirschfeld received the right of issuing directives to the agencies of the Ministry for Water Ways and that he took the chairmanship of an organization which assumed the control especially the distribution of the transports.

Besides Dr. Hirschfeld, the commission consisted of the mayors of Rotterdam and Amsterdam and the executive body was the so-called Central Shipping Office (Voedsel Vrorzioning)

13.) Did it take some weeks - say the second half of November - to put back the traffic into operation?

To 13) I can give no information.

14.) Did the Reich Commissioner give the Committee every possible help, as regards the delivery of bunker coal, and the hindering of the seizure of ships and tug boats by the Wehrmacht etc.?

To 14) The Reich Commissioner had issued the directive to aid the Dutch Authorities extensively according to the given possibilities. Thus the German civilian agencies made continous efforts in order to obtain the necessary shipping space from the Wehrmacht, and it is obvious that the discussion with the fighting or retreating and evacuating troops were not easy.

H0803-0123

H0803-0124

On my instigation the Reich Commissar seriously warned the Chief of the Maritime Transportation to release the ships necessary for the transportation of food and, as far as I remember, also intervened with the Nav High Command in Berlin, for the same purpose. Particular efforts were made to bring the coal to the right stations necessary to carry out the transports. When, on account of the general situation the procurement of coal became almost impossible, attempts were made in Amsterdam in order to help the food tugs with substitute fuel.

15.) Were 200,000 tons of food brought to Holland by this means ?

16.) Did the Reich Commissioner order additional food for 250 000 children to be brought to Holland by direct means of communication?

To 15 and 16) I cannot give any information because I paid attention only to keep communications as a whole as smooth as possible but I did not have at my disposal detailed information concerning kind and quantity of the goods transported.

17.) Were the port demolitions, etc. in the fall of 1944 and the spring of 1945 ordered by the Wehrmacht for military reasons exclusively ?

To 17) The blasting operations carried out in the ports were exclusively a matter concerning the Wehrmacht.

18.) Did the offices of the Reich Commissioner and especially their trustee use their influence to limit the demolitions as much as possible ?

To 18) Despite the fact that I have no data available on this subject, I know from numerous conversations, that not only the agencies of the Reich commissioner, but that also numerous local Wehrmacht agencies made attempts to prevent the blasting operations.

H0803-0125

19.) Did the confiscation of motor vehicles take place exclusively through the Wehrmacht or according to its wishes and for Wehrmacht purpos To 19) I have already mentioned under 1). that the local traffic was an independant branch of the administration and that I was only roughly familiar with it. But i know that the Wehrmacht was the main customer and beneficiary of Dutch motor vehicles. Confiscations made by other authori agencies must be considered as exceptions in relation to the needs of the Wehrmacht.

20.) Concerning the confiscation of bicycles: did approximately 4 million bicycles exist in the Netherlands? Were only on one occasion (1942) 50,000 bicycles asked for against payment, at the request of the Wehrmach and through the offices of the Reich Commissioner to be used for Wehrmach requirements ?

To 20) As far as the "bicycles action" is concerned, I was neither in charge nor did I take part in it.

" " Cross-examination Dr. Bolle "

1: I do not know anything of the Reich commissioner's threat of famine if the transportation strike did not cease.

2-4: The question concerning an embargo, by which I understand a prohibit against transportation, is not comprehensible to me. I am not aware that the navy prohibited the transportation of food.

5-and 6: The powers which were entrusted to Dr. Hirschfeld had nothing to do with the frost period. They were based on purely factual reasons in the interests of a good execution of the operation and in order to avoid friction within the Dutch department. I have already mentioned that on the part of the Dutch the distribution to the Western sector of food supplies arriving in Amsterdam, caused some difficulties. Dr. Hirschfeld told me once, that he had very serious

H0803-0126

discussions with the mayors of Amsterdam and Rotterdam about the way the distribution was operated. He used the expression to me "At first there was a big row". Since I was a partner of the Waterways (Waterstrat) Ministry, I can no longer give any precise facts as to the formation of the central shipping office and its operations.

7: In my opinion, which was based on the advice of my inland navigation expert, there was enough shipping space available. On the German side, one was necessarily under the impression, on the grounds of numerous observations, that as many applications as possible were submitted by the Dutch for their exemption with the main purpose of protecting their ships against a possible intervention of the Wehrmacht. Time and again the navy reported cases where ships provided with certification of exemption were not used for the transportation of food.

8 and 9: I cannot furnish any information concerning the quantities transported, which were dependent upon the accompanying circumstances of the moment (starting difficulties, organisational questions, frost periods, economic difficulties of all kind).

10 and 11: A police block existed on the Yssel, which the inhabitants of the Western territories were forbidden to cross. But I have heard that the Reich commissioner delayed until after this second frost period the strict operations of this police block in regard to women, whose efforts, on foot and on bicycle, to procure food commanded his respect.

12:: No special permits existed for certain privileged persons, especially not for the purpose of food procurement. I have issued permits for crossing the Yssel line only to officials of the waterstrat and for the purpose of organizing and controlling the traffic. I categorically deny

H0803-0127

having been connected in any way with the deputy of the City of Amsterdam, Stark. I knew of Mr. Stark that he controlled all the goods arriving by ship in Amsterdam, and that by this fact he disturbed the food distribution in the West. Dr. Hirschfeld also knows about these facts and about my desire to eliminate Mr. Stark.

13: See to 12).

14: I cannot give any information concerning the allotments received by the occupation authorities. But I have noticed that during the winter of 1944/45 the allotments to the occupation authorities continually decreased, and that qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

I am aware of the fact that this affidavit will be used before an official authority or a court.

The original protocol which remains in my possession, was read to the party concerned, approved and personally signed by him as follows, and also duly signed and sealed by me, the Notary Public.

sgd. Dr. Arved Bolle

(L.S.Not.) sgd. Dr. H. Kiesselbach

Costs:

Value: Rm 2,000.-- indefinite

Fee: Para. 144, 26 29 I RM 16.--

Tax " -.48

RM 16.48

The Notary Public
sgd. Ki.

Above testimony is herewith disposed for the f i r s t time and this first copy handed over to Mr. Arved Bolle, Hamburg-Fu., Heinrich Traunstr.8.

Hamburg, 4 July 1946

The Notary Public

sgd. Dr. Kiesselbach

Seal.

H0803-0128

I certify herewith that the above copy is artrue copy of the text in my possession.

(Dr. Gustav Steinbauer)